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ARTICLES
THE LEGAL NATURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
UNITED STATES COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
William H. Daughtrey, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The courts serve as the ultimate guardians of the free expression
of ideas in colleges and universities throughout the United States.
While the Constitution does not enumerate any specific right of
academic freedom, the Supreme Court of the United States has
employed the first and fourteenth amendments to help ensure that
academic institutions can continue to be forums for the unfettered
exchange of ideas.1 State constitutions and statutes also help de-
termine the contours of academic freedom.2
Application of a concept as noble as academic freedom is bound
to provoke debate since it protects the liberty to pursue and teach
ideas freely although these ideas may be contrary to popular opin-
ion. The exercise of academic freedom can be protected by an aca-
* Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University;
B.S., 1955, Hampden-Sydney College; J.D., 1958, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond. The author is a member of the Virginia State and American Bar Associations,
and of Phi Beta Kappa. He has published in the AMERICAN BuSINEss LAW JOURNAL, law
reviews, and other legal and social science journals.
1. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); see also
infra notes 116-24, 133-40, 142 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., McKillop v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (applying California law and denying access to tenure review materials sought by
plaintiff in sex discrimination case); Kahn v. Superior Court (Davies), 188 Cal. App. 3d 752,
233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987) (finding California constitutional privacy right allowed nondisclo-
sure of faculty committee discussions leading up to decision to reject candidate for a history
department chair); see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton
Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
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demic institution as well as by government. The level of protection
afforded by a particular college or university is influenced by insti-
tutional goals and by a desire for orderly administration. Both
long-range planning and day-to-day operations are, in turn, influ-
enced by external opinions, including those of alumni, benefactors,
and the public at large. Consequently, tension naturally occurs
when a professor freely expresses beliefs that are not shared by
others. An expression of unpopular views could adversely effect an
academic's career advancement.
The creditability of any public or private institution should de-
pend upon its ability to survive as a marketplace of ideas, even
when some of the values 'espoused appear to be patently absurd or
eons ahead of their time. The law will not judge the absurdity of
an idea in protecting free speech.3 A major criterion in determining
relative rank in academia should be the ability of a college or uni-
versity to provide and monitor a forum for idea dissemination
successfully.
Ideally, a post-secondary educational institution should provide
an environment for the intelligent exchange of thought without the
aid of courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States
and other courts have found it necessary to explore academic free-
dom in such disparate factual situations as controversial lectures
that have favored Marxist economic philosophy4 and tenure deci-
sions in which a university sought anonymity for peer evaluators.
3. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957). "History has amply proved the
virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups .... Mere unorthodoxy or dissent
from the prevailing mores is not to be condemned. The absence of such voices would be a
symptom of grave illness in our society." Id.
4. Id. (upholding a professor's first amendment right not to disclose the content of a guest
lecture he delivered and his knowledge of the Progressive Party and its members).
5. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 110 S. Ct.
577 (1990) (finding that academic freedom did not protect the university's interest in ten-
ure-review materials sought by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in
investigating allegations of Title VII violation); see generally EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall
College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (granting EEOC
access to peer review material despite college's claim of confidentiality under the concept of
academic freedom); EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.
1983) (relying on academic freedom to find an institutional qualified privilege against disclo-
sure of faculty personnel files to EEOC); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d
Cir. 1982) (compelling discovery of votes of tenure committee members in civil rights action
despite courts allowance for qualified evidentiary privilege predicated on academic free-
dom); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blauberg,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (holding professor in contempt of court for his refusal on ground of
academic freedom to answer deposition question about how he voted on promotion of fe-
male faculty member who claimed employment discrimination).
234 [Vol. 25:233
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In the adjudicatory process, courts have recognized the value of
academic freedom for professors6 and have suggested that the
same freedom may exist for the academic institutions themselves.7
However, protection of academic freedom for colleges and universi-
ties, as well as for their individual scholars, is warranted only to
the extent that society benefits from the protection of the free dis-
semination of ideas.8
The Supreme Court has not expressly recognized the difference
between individual and institutional academic freedom in develop-
ing the outer limits of this concept. Perusal of case law, however,
strongly suggests that a finding or a denial of academic freedom
largely depends upon whether the person seeking its protection is a
human being or an institution." In addition to protecting a profes-
sor's promulgation of ideas, academic freedom has also been ap-
plied to institutions as a means of justifying the nondisclosure of
college and university personnel records relevant to allegations of a
wrongful tenure or promotion denial,10 and as a proper reason for
denying citizen use of university property in the exercise of their
right of free speech."
This article investigates the judicially articulated rationales for
protecting certain conduct under the umbrella of academic free-
dom. Relying mainly on the free speech guarantee of the first and
fourteenth amendments, the courts have espoused and discussed
academic freedom without articulating a clear definition of that
concept.12 Because of this ambiguity, and the variety of situations
6. See infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-58, 76-80, 163-67, 174-75, 177-190 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990); Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); Sheltan v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1988).
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that University of Missouri's exclu-
sion of a registered student religious group from open forum facilities violated first amend-
ment free speech guarantee); Heal v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (remanding controversy
between Central Connecticut State College and local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society for evidentiary hearing to determine whether chapter was willing to abide by reason-
able campus rules and regulations in determining whether college's refusal to recognize the
student group violated first amendment free speech and association guarantees).
12. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 577; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263; Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 234; see also infra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
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in which this issue has arisen, the law does not foster predictabil-
ity. For example, the law appears to encourage academic freedom
in instances where common sense and fairness negate protection of
such freedom.' 3 More specifically, in litigation, some colleges and
universities have used the first amendment based freedom in lieu
of reliance on institutional autonomy, which is not seated on a con-
stitutional base.
This article also examines the effect that academic freedom case
law has had on the operation of colleges and universities. An edu-
cator's free speech and an educational entity's exercise of institu-
tional autonomy affect societal interests. This article explores fac-
tors important in determining the parameters of academic
freedom. These factors are: (1) whether the protection of academic
freedom should be afforded institutions as well as individuals; (2)
whether the scholar's protection should depend upon his em-
ployer's status as a publically or privately owned and operated in-
stitution; (3) whether the professor whose conduct is at issue is
tenured or not; (4) whether scholars claim this freedom against the
state14 or against th6 institution employing them;' 5 and (5)
whether colleges and universities should be permitted to rely on
academic freedom as insulation from governmental interference
into their policies and operations.' 6
Case law discussions of both institutional and individual aca-
demic freedom provide some understanding of the extent to which
courts, especially the Supreme Court of the United States, find
that this concept protects societal interests in free speech and as-
sembly. The courts do not appear to separate scholar and entity
academic freedom.' This article suggests that institutional aca-
13. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 577 (rejecting the University's
contention that institutional academic freedom was a basis for denying EEOC access to peer
review information in evaluating allegations of impermissible discrimination in tenure
denial).
14. See, e.g., Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50, 261-64 (espousing academic freedom as a ground
for vindicating professor who refused to answer certain questions posed to him in legislative
investigation to eliminate subversive persons from state government).
15. See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 593; Roth, 408 U.S. at 564.
16. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 577; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; Kahn v.
Superior Court (Davies), 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987); State v. Schmid,
84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455
U.S. 100 (1982).
17. However, in Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter appeared to have fused individual and insti-
tutional academic freedoms in his concurring opinion. 354 U.S. at 255-67. In his rationale
extending first amendment rights to a United States scholar, he quoted a plea of South
African scholars against governmental intervention into the affairs of their universities. Id.
[Vol. 25:233
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demic freedom could often be more accurately described as institu-
tional autonomy.
II. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The nature of institutional autonomy encompasses the idea of
academic freedom for colleges and universities. The desirability of
government nonintervention into the decisions of an educational
institution is not always related to the institution's role as a base
camp for experimentation and other research leading to informed
public opinion. Some governmental intervention into the affairs of
a college or university does not affect the institution's role of in-
creasing the common body of knowledge. Even absent a compelling
first amendment reason for granting academic freedom, however,
government nonintervention may be appropriate.18 Historical and
current examples illustrate that institutional autonomy may exist
for purposes other than academic freedom.
One ancient example of an establishment of institutional auton-
omy unrelated to the protection of the free exchange of ideas is the
granting of civil jurisdiction over alien students to the University
at Bologna.'9 This policy encouraged foreigners to enter Bologna to
study by allowing them to avoid some of the ordinary duties of
citizenship, 0 thereby increasing the diversity of the student body.
Another ancient example of institutional autonomy unrelated to
academic freedom is the Parisian university's power to control lec-
tures and sermons delivered anywhere in Paris without having to
answer to the French Parliament.21 Here the ecclesiastically-based
autonomy, subject only to the authority of the king,22 had a poten-
tially adverse effect on freedom of speech. The control over lec-
tures and sermons could squelch, as well as promote, the exposi-
tion of new ideas.
The German experience provides another example. Many attri-
bute the international preeminence of German universities to their
adherence to three propositions which, in translation, are: (1) the
freedom of students to learn without administrative constraints;
at 262-64; see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a continuation of the fusion
concept.
18. See Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
19. H. RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 151 (1936).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 427-28.
22. Id.
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(2) the freedom of university professors to pursue their research,
report upon it, and teach; and (3) the freedom of the institution to
determine academic matters without interference from the govern-
ment.2" The first two propositions mentioned may obviously and
fairly be labeled "academic freedom." The last, autonomy of the
institution as a self-governing entity of the faculty, was never im-
ported into the United States. While European universities are
governed by faculty or students, the governing bodies of colleges
and universities in the United States, on the other hand, are com-
prised for the most part of nonacademics. These institutional
board members are selected by a political process for state institu-
tions, and by self-perpetuating boards or others not on the faculty
for private schools.
Currently, rather broad institutional autonomy is assured col-
leges and universities. This autonomy, or discretionary authority,
arises from common law doctrines, statutes, and in some instances,
from state constitutions. 24 Before discussing the grants of auton-
omy to modern post-secondary educational institutions in the
United States, it is helpful to explore the possibility that some in-
stitutional conduct may be protected under the concept of aca-
demic freedom.
The Supreme Court of the United States first articulated the
concept of institutional academic freedom in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire.2 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Warren ac-
knowledged the beneficial role of unrestrained academia:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universi-
ties is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our
youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Na-
tion .... Teachers and students must always remain free to in-
quire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and under-
standing; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.26
23. R. HOFSTADER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 386-87 (1955).
24. See Kahn v. Superior Court (Davies), 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987).
25. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). In Sweezy, the state of New Hampshire brought charges against
a state university professor for violation of a state statute designed to "eliminate 'subversive
persons' among government personnel." Id. at 236. The state's investigation of the professor
included asking him questions regarding the context of his lectures and any affiliations he
may have had with the communist party. The Supreme Court held he did not have to an-
swer these questions because of his first amendment freedoms.
26. Id. at 250.
[Vol. 25:233
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The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter was even more ex-
pansive in expressing that "the dependence of a free society on
free universities, 27 necessitated the existence of "'the four essen-
tial freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."2
Although the Sweezy plurality and concurring opinions did not
agree on the theory applicable in purging Sweezy of contempt for
his failure to disclose the topic of his guest lecture at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire,2" the Chief Justice and five Justices to-
gether laid the groundwork for later contentions that institutional
academic freedom exists. The plurality reasoned that the legisla-
ture separated its investigatory powers from its responsibility to
direct the use of that power.30 The concurrence based its conclu-
sion on the first amendment right of a citizen to free speech and
political privacy.3 '
In announcing the court's judgment in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 2 Justice Powell stated that "[a]cademic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated right, long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."3 3 He reiter-
ated Justice Frankfurter's "four essential freedoms"3 4 in response
to one of the medical school's arguments that its admission pro-
gram favoring African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Mexican-
Americans was constitutionally permissible, since it served to pro-
vide a diverse student body. While Justice Powell accepted the
school's assertion that "tradition and experience lend support to
27. Id. at 262. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 263. (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (1957) (a state-
ment of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand)).
29. 354 U.S. at 253-55, 265-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Court's opinion by Chief
Justice Warren includes no reference to the text of the Constitution or to precedent. Nor
did Justice Frankfurter cite specific legal precedent in deciding against the state and against
governmental intrusion into the life of a university. Id.
30. Id. at 235-55.
31. Id. at 255-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Id. at 312 (Powell, J., announcing the Court's judgment and expressing his own
views).
34. Id.; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial, 3 5 he re-
jected the goal of diversity alone as sufficient to justify the ques-
tioned admissions program, absent proof that the program's racial
classification was necessary to promote the interest of diversity.36
Even though the concept of academic freedom failed to justify the
admissions program, Bakke nevertheless provides additional judi-
cial opinion that institutional academic freedom exists.
The existence of institutional academic freedom also finds sup-
port in Widmar v. Vincent.3 7 Justice Powell, writing for the
Widmar majority, affirmed "the right of the University to make
academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or
to 'determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.' 38 The Widmar Court declined, however, to find institu-
tional academic freedom more important than "the fundamental
principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-
neutral. 3 19
Sweezy, Bakke, and Widmar introduce a concept of academic
freedom that is derived not from orthodox constitutional roots or
reasoning, but rather from the acknowledgment of the importance
of the participation of academia in the formation of public policy.
Post-secondary educational institutions, while powerless to insti-
tute reforms, are well positioned to identify important societal
problems and to suggest solutions. Academic freedom serves to
provide political information for voters as legislative tasks become
more difficult in view of the population growth and of the effec-
tiveness of lobbyists and their special interest groups. Protecting
the free expression of ideas of academics, especially those of politi-
cal scientists and sociologists, is important, if not vital, to the task
of informing the electorate.
As important as are the four cited freedoms for academic institu-
tions,4" other social interests necessitate establishing parameters
for the exercise of these freedoms, such as the established constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech, assembly, and religion. In addi-
tion, institutional "academic freedom" may be limited by constitu-
35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
36. Id. at 314-15.
37. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
38. Id. at 276 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
39. 454 U.S. at 276.
40. See supra notes 28, 38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25:233
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tional and statutory rights of individuals. A conflict may arise
between a university's right to determine who will teach and the
federal laws proscribing discrimination in employment. The Su-
preme Court recently resolved just such a conflict in a case involv-
ing an academic tenure dispute.41 Before turning to the facts of
that case, however, we need to explore the general nature of aca-
demic tenure and the procedures for obtaining it.
A. Academic Freedom and Tenure Peer Review
The peer review process for awarding academic tenure is deemed
central to the proper functioning of colleges and universities. 42 The
rather elaborate process allows an institution the opportunity to
evaluate a professor after some period of time (often six .years) to
determine whether the individual should be afforded continuous
employment. The integrity of the process is not only important in
the allocation of the institution's limited resources in view of its
goals and standards, but is also important with regard to fairness
to the probationary professor seeking tenure. Fairness, of course,
requires an objective evaluation of the candidate's contributions in
view of the standards set by the institution at which he seeks vir-
tually life-time employment. Since a professor should be judged in
part upon his or her creativity in contributing to the school's suc-
cess, the evaluation includes some elements of subjectivity.43
41. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
42. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 586 (university asserted that the peer
review process is the most important element in the effective operation of a tenure system
and such a system determines what the university will look like over time); EEOC v. Frank-
lin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing the importance of
confidentiality in the peer review process), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986); EEOC v. Uni-
versity of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the peer
review process for faculty tenure is the best and most reliable method of promoting aca-
demic excellence); McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of California, 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) (claiming that the peer recommendation system for faculty tenure at the Univer-
sity of California produced one of the finest institutions of higher learning in the United
States and the pre-eminent state university in California); see also C. BYSE & L. JOUGHLIN,
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION vi-ii (1959) (reporting that in many colleges and
universities pre-tenure faculty serve a testing period on the job); R. MILLER, EVALUATING
FACULTY FOR PROMOTION AND TENURE (1987) (suggesting that the tenure process should en-
able an institution to retain faculty best suited to its nature and directions); FACULTY TEN-
URE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION BY THE COMMISSION ON A.CADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 1-20 (1973) (discussing the pros and cons of a tenure system including the posi-
tive impact on academic freedom and also the elimination of employment decisions that
might otherwise result from generosity, friendship, or neglect).
43. Unfairness often results when a significant gap exists between the tenure standards
announced by the institution and the application of those standards. The law, however, does
1991]
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Tenure is worth the professorial effort to obtain it. While not an
absolute guarantee of life-time employment by the college or uni-
versity awarding it, tenure affords a fair amount of job security.
Generally, the tenured professor cannot be dismissed absent (1)
conduct of the individual constituting good cause for termination
or (2) a demonstrably bona fide financial exigency, or bona fide
discontinuance of a program or department."' In addition, tenure
affords the professor status within and beyond the college or uni-
versity that rewarded him the long-term employment agreement.
Considering the economic and professional advantages of the
tenured status, tenure decision procedures traditionally provide for
thorough evaluations by the employer's administrators, the candi-
date's on-campus peers, and by off-campus colleagues4 5 familiar
with the candidate's' work within the pertinent academic disci-
pline.46 While some evaluators may participate frequently in ten-
not generally provide redress in such situations. The gap is significant only as evidence that
the employer has violated some constitutional guarantee or statutory provision such as Title
VII. The concept of institutional autonomy sometimes permits unfairness of the type de-
scribed here. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
Institutional autonomy was recognized in University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 577
where the Court found "[tihe [EEOC] is not providing criteria that [the University] must
use in selecting teachers. Nor is it preventing the University from using any criteria it may
wish to use, except those-including race, sex, and national origin-that are proscribed
under Title VII." Id. at 587.
44. See, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 678-80 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding
the discharge of tenured professor legally permissible on the ground of financial exigency
although the college's by-laws mentioned the possibility of discharge only after age 65 or for
cause).
Dismissals for cause of tenured faculty do not encompass institutional financial exigency.
Rather, they are based on professorial incompetency or neglect of duty or moral turpitude.
Dismissals for cause contemplate formal charges and an opportunity to answer the charges,
with the burden of proof upon the institution. See id. at 679.
The position of the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") is that ter-
mination of a tenured appointment shall occur only for financial exigency, program discon-
tinuance not mandated by financial exigency, or medical reasons. Presumably, since moral
turpitude is not mentioned, these are but some examples of what AAUP considers "ade-
quate cause." 1982 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 23-25 (AAUP, Washington, D.C. 1984).
45. These off-campus colleagues are often referred to in academia as "outside reviewers."
46. See, e.g., EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1985)
(tenure candidate evaluated by Professional Standards Committee made up of dean and five
faculty-elected members, the president of the college, and the College's Grievance Commit-
tee), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986); Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis-
consin Sys., 769 F.2d 1235, 1237-39 (7th Cir. 1985) (tenure applicant was evaluated by the
Salary and Promotion Committee which considered letters reviewing her work by scholars
from outside her department, including the Zoology Department Committee, the Biological
Sciences Divisional Committee, her dean, the University Committee,
and-presumably-higher authority all prior to her suit alleging sex discrimination), cert.
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ure reviews, most of them, especially instructional faculty, serve
infrequently and are essentially amateur rather than professional
reviewers. Not only does infrequency of service make their task
difficult, but sometimes gaps between stated institutional goals and
operational realities make it difficult to opine that a candidate de-
serves or does not deserve tenure.
When candidates are unsuccessful in their quest for extended
employment, they naturally want to know the grounds for rejec-
tion. Academic freedom has been suggested by some colleges and
universities as a basis for denying rejected candidates access to
documents generated and used in the review process. These insti-
tutions argue that confidentiality in peer review systems is impor-
tant in obtaining candid and honest assessments of candidates
under scrutiny.4 These assessments are crucial, the argument con-
tinues, to the institution's freedom to determine "who may
teach. '" 8
The Supreme Court recently addressed the tension between con-
fidentiality for evaluators and Title VII discovery rights in Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion.4' The university's argument, as restated by the Court, was
"that the First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of peer re-
view materials because disclosure undermines the confidentiality
which is central to the peer review process, and this in turn is cen-
tral to the tenure process, which in turn is the means by which
[the university] seeks to exercise its asserted academic-freedom
right of choosing who will teach."50
Rosalie Tung alleged that she was denied tenure by the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania on the basis of her race, sex, and national ori-
gin-in violation of her Title VII rights.5 1. Tung did not officially
denied, 474 U.S. 106 (1986). For the various functional levels at which the tenure candidate
is evaluated, see C. BYSE & L. JOUGHLIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 35-38
(1959) (describing reviews by the departmental faculty committee, the department head, the
general faculty committee, the dean, the faculty administration (university) committee, the
president, and the governing board). Although this multi-layered system was described over
30 years ago, it is probably even more widespread now considering the growth in size of the
faculty at many colleges and universities.
47. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
49. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
50. Id. at 587-88.
51. Id. at 580 (Tung alleged a violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988)).
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receive a reason for her lack of success. She learned unofficially,
however, that the Wharton School's lack of interest in China-re-
lated research was why the Personnel Committee recommended
against her becoming tenured. 52
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
subpoenaed confidential letters written by Tung's evaluators, the
department chairman's evaluation, and other documents reflecting
the deliberations of the faculty committees participating in the
tenuring process. The subpoena also sought comparable portions of
the personnel files of five males who had been granted tenure, in
order to consider Tung's allegations that they were equally or less
qualified than she.53
Even without the advantage of hindsight, it is not surprising
that the Court unanimously held that the institution must furnish
the requested information to the EEOC. 4 While the Court proba-
bly could have relied entirely on mandates of Title VII 55 and Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501, it also found that the disclosure of the
information did not impermissibly infringe on the university's
right to determine who may teach.56 The Court, describing the in-
stitutionally asserted injury from the disclosure as "speculative, ' 57
as well as "remote and attenuated," 8 did .not place the requested
confidentiality under the umbrella of academic freedom.
The Court granted certiorari in University of Pennsylvania
"[b]ecause of what might be thought of as a conflict in approach" 5
between the Third Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Franklin and
Marshall College0 and the holding of the Seventh Circuit's in
EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac." In Notre Dame, the
court found a qualified academic freedom privilege, permitting the
university "to redact the name, address, institutional affiliation,
and any other identifying features (e.g., publications, professional
honors received, or any other material which could be used to iden-
52. 110 S. Ct. at 580.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 589.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -8(a), -9 (1988).
56. 110 S. Ct. at 586-88.
57. Id. at 588.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 581.
60. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
61. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
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tify the particular academician) of the reporting scholar. '6 2
Franklin and Marshall contrasts with Notre Dame in that while
redaction in the former took place pursuant to a district court
order,63 Notre Dame voluntarily produced redacted files to the
EEOC.6 4 The two decisions appear to agree on the point at which
or the circumstances under which the evaluators must be identified
during the course of the EEOC's investigation. The "conflict in ap-
proach" in these two circuit court decisions, alluded to by the Su-
preme Court, 5 appears to lie less in the ultimate access by EEOC
to "confidential" information and more in the appropriate role of
academic freedom as the basis for nondisclosure. The Seventh Cir-
cuit relied upon academic freedom to establish a qualified peer re-
view privilege, avoiding disclosure of the identity of a reviewer un-
til the claimant particularizes a need to know his or her evaluator's
identity.6 6 The Third Circuit, on the other hand, rejected the con-
tention that academic freedom was relevant to requiring disclo-
sure. The court declined to recognize a qualified academic privi-
lege, and refused to adopt any balancing approach in determining
the EEOC's right of access. 7
The Second Circuit has also considered the contention that a
qualified academic freedom privilege protects the confidentiality of
information generated in the tenuring process. In Gray v. Board of
Higher Education, City of New York,6 the court, although recog-
nizing a qualified academic privilege, held this interest in academic
freedom did not outweigh a black educator's interest in discovering
the identity of two committee members who recommended against
his tenure.6 The court found that the educator's need for informa-
tion to prove discriminatory intent was more important than the
college's interest in maintaining confidentiality of the votes.7
62. Id. at 338. District courts are assigned the task of reviewing the files to determine
whether redactions are reasonably necessary to prevent disclosure of the identity of the
scholar providing the evaluation. Id.
63. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 117.
64. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 337 n.4.
65. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 581.
66. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 335-39.
67. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 114-17.
68. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 908.
70. Id. Dr. S. Simpson Gray, a black educator, sought redress under §§ 42 U.S.C. 1981,
1983, 1985. These statutes require him to show more than discriminatory impact for his §
1981 claim and discriminatory intent for his fourteenth amendment claim in contrast to a
Title VII claim which does not require direct proof of discriminatory intent. 692 F.2d at 905.
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Those who assert a qualified privilege not to disclose certain in-
formation during the investigatory stage of the employee's or for-
mer employee's claim, stress disclosure's putatively chilling effect
on the procurement and quality of evaluators' comments and con-
clusions. It was argued in Gray that disclosure of how two tenure
committee members voted would chill candid peer evaluations and
disturb harmony of faculty relations. 1 In Franklin and Marshall,
the disclosure of documents involving on and off campus evalu-
ators would likely result in less than "candid, honest assessments
of the candidates under review"72 as well as embarrassment and
confrontational situations. In Notre Dame, disclosure would re-
quire the university to breach the promise of confidentiality given
in advance to evaluators and deemed critical by the university in
obtaining candid and frank evaluations in all cases23 After Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania,4 it would appear that none of these consid-
erations, singularly or together, suffice to create an evidentiary
privilege against a rejected tenure applicant who alleges impermis-
sible discrimination in the tenure process. Thus, discovery tri-
umphs when pitted against whatever public good may transcend
from confidentiality of peer-review generated views and
conclusions.
University of Pennsylvania obviously required a balancing of so-
ciety's interest in academic freedom for institutions and society's
concern over fairness in tenuring educators with due regard for
congressional mandates and the law of evidence.7 5 The unanimous
decision rejects academic freedom as a ground for confidentiality
for peer review evaluators. Thus, it appears that the societal value
in obtaining the truth when impermissible discrimination is alleged
is more important to society than anonymity for evaluators who
opine about or vote on a candidate for tenure.
Although now eclipsed by the authority of University of Penn-
sylvania v. EEOC, the case In re Dinnan76 lucidly articulates the
reasons for rejecting peer review confidentiality on the ground of
As in EEOC investigations, however, Gray sought discovery of peer review information prior
to trial. Id. at 901-02.
71. Id. at 907.
72. 775 F.2d at 114.
73. 715 F.2d at 336.
74. 110 S. Ct. at 577.
75. Id.
76. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blauberg, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
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institutional academic freedom or as an appropriate evidentiary
privilege. In addressing the tenure committee member's refusal to
reveal how he voted, the Dinnan court reiterated that "exceptions
to the demand for every man's evidence . . . are in derogation of
the search for truth. '7 7 The federal circuit court also noted that,
"ideas may be suppressed just as effectively by denying tenure as
by prohibiting the teaching of certain courses." 8 The court con-
cluded that the decision disallowing confidentiality "should work
to reinforce responsible decision-making in tenure questions"7 9 by
eliminating secrecy claimed under the tent of institutional aca-
demic freedom. While Dinnan was not mentioned in University of
Pennsylvania, the philosophy of the federal circuit court appears
to anticipate the Supreme Court's view that "[n]ot all academics
will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their
peers" 8 even knowing of the possibility that their stance might
later be disclosed.
B. Time for Identifying Evaluators
Although the Supreme Court did not favor academic freedom
over the EEOC's investigatory needs, the Court did recognize the
need for some degree of institutional autonomy. The issue not
clearly determined in University of Pennsylvania involves the
threshold circumstances under which the EEOC becomes entitled
to know the identity of the evaluators. The particular issue is
whether the law permits redaction of the records subpoenaed by
the EEOC. Since this issue was not fully considered by the district
court, it was not resolved on appeal."' If the law permits initial
removal of the names and other information which would identify
the evaluators, and requires disclosure of their identities later only
after the EEOC demonstrates a particularized need to evaluate the
evaluators, then the tenure candidate's college or university can re-
tain greater control over the release of this information. The deter-
mination of this issue will affect the degree of autonomy the law
grants academic institutions-without the need to consider insti-
tutional academic freedom which the Supreme Court has deter-
mined will not protect "confidential" peer review materials from
77. Id. at 430 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
78. Id. at 430.
79. Id. at 432.
80. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 588.
81. Id. at 581 n.2.
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disclosure.
III. 'INDIVIDUAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom should enable teachers and students to teach
and learn without being harassed for their philosophical, political,
or ideological beliefs. This academic freedom has many protectors.
Although not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, it is
often protected by the first amendment. 2 Other protectors include
state laws, the American Association of University Professors, and
in varying degrees individual colleges and universities through
their policies and practices.
The value of academic freedom was most elegantly described by
Justice Frankfurter:
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to find-
ings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature
are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in
the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are
called the social sciences, the concern of which is man and society.
The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropol-
ogy, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of schol-
arship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable
division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic per-
plexities. For society's good-if understanding be an essential need
of society-inquiries into these problems, speculations about them,
stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfet-
tered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into
this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government
and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and
obviously compelling.8 3
A. Views of the American Association of University Professors
Courts have referred to the American Association of University
Professors' ("AAUP") statements8 4 concerning academic free-
82. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J., announc-
ing the Court's judgment and expressing his own views) (rejecting academic freedom as a
ground for judicial acceptance of a medical school's admissions program found to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
83. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
84. Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles and Interpretive Com-
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dom.5 The AAUP positions are helpful in determining the param-
eters of individual academic freedom for two reasons. First, due to
the wide latitude colleges and universities have in determining who
will teach or do research under their auspices,8 6 they should follow
expected norms announced by the AAUP unless the contract of
employment notes a contrary agreed-upon expectation of the em-
ployer. Second, the responsibility of protecting a professor's free-
dom to express himself and to make intellectual inquiry lies first
with the employer. The 1940 Statement of the AAUP regarding
Academic Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement") is a significant
effort to help assure the types of institutional and professional con-
duct that are essential to meaningful teaching and research.8 7
Since the AAUP's position on academic freedom and tenure is
designed to guide all colleges and universities, its position does not
anticipate complete uniformity in the professor-institution rela-
tionship. The AAUP anticipates variations expressly with regard to
research for pay and in recognition of the religious or '"other
aims" ' of a particular post-secondary educational institution.
Since the AAUP guidance admonishes the professor that he
"should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate re-
ments, supplemented by 1982 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Free-
dom and Tenure, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3-9. 21-30 (AAUP, Washington,
D.C. 1984) [hereinafter AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS].
85. See, e.g., Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1982) (adopting
the AAUP position that keeping tenure committee voting confidential is acceptable even
when the candidate is rejected, if the candidate receives a statement outlining reasons for
non-selection and is afforded adequate intramural grievance procedures); Krotkoff v.
Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 682 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing AAUP's policy statements sanc-
tioning the dismissal of tenured faculty because of financial exigency); Browzin v. Catholic
Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 845-49 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (interpreting AAUP regulations gov-
erning termination of tenure based on financial exigency or program discontinuation and
requiring the institution to make every effort to find the professor another suitable position
elsewhere in the university); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 932 n.l, 934-35 (9th Cir.
1975) (remanding termination-for-cause case to determine whether University of Nevada
would interpret its code copied from AAUP Statement of Principles as AAUP would inter-
pret the same provisions in view of tenured professor's allegation of violation of first amend-
ment rights); Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 984-87 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 829 (1975) (finding that failure to provide as much notice of termination of untenured
professors as designated by AAUP and incorporated into University of Missouri regulations
did not create de facto tenure status); Blair v. Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir.
1974) (finding due process given to terminated probationary professor and noting that
Memphis State University, Tennessee, had followed AAUP recommended procedures).
86. See Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Lieberman v.
Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORT, supra note 84.
88. Id. at 2.
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straint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should
make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokes-
man,"'89 the admonition may condemn some conduct that would be
protected free speech under the first amendment.90 In the event of
a conflict between the AAUP Statement and the Constitution, con-
stitutional mandates will obviously prevail. The AAUP recognized
the potential conflict in a 1982 supplement to the 1940 Statement 9'
which included a quotation from Sweezy v. New Hampshire92
stressing that "teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate. 91 3
Where law or institutional policy and practices define academic
freedom, teachers find security in knowing that their intellectual
expressions and experimentations will not be directed by the con-
flicting values of others who oppose their beliefs, stated values, or
hypotheses. Similarly, students know that the teacher's utterances
represent his or her best professional judgment, and do not simply
reflect the institution's attitudes.
While there is no such thing as a false opinion or belief, and
students in post-secondary educational institutions should have
the opportunity to examine conflict between ideas, free speech is
not unlimitedly free. One legal limitation on speaking out is civil
liability for defamation. 4 The government may also limit or pro-
scribe speech which "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. ' 95 Be-
yond governmental restrictions, the professor's professional repu-
tation depends upon the basis for, and manner in which, an idea is
expressed. Except for the most callous academic, this final factor
alone should prevent an abuse of academic freedom. Absent self-
restraint and pride in the methodology of one's academic disci-
89. Id.
90. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250, 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
91. See AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 84.
92. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
93. AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 84 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at
250).
94. Defined by state law, generally defamation is the injuring of a person's character or
reputation by making false statements orally (slander) or in writing (libel), although many
factors are relevant in a determination of liability for defamation in a particular case. See,
e.g., Great Coastal Express v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846 (1985).
95. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (condemning a state statute as viola-
tive of the first and fourteenth amendments because it forbade advocacy of the use of force
or of a legal violation without considering whether such advocacy was directed and likely to
incite or produce imminent lawless action).
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pline, however, career advancement should be difficult and legal
action may be appropriate.
Any professor, regardless of his status or whether he teaches at a
public or private institution, may claim that he was improperly
terminated as a result of his exercise of permissible academic free-
dom. The degree to which the law will protect the questioned con-
duct is less if the teacher is untenured, works for a private college
or university, or both. While these two factors theoretically have
no relation to the societal value of a professor's inquiries or pro-
nouncements, the reality is that a tenured faculty member at a
state school currently has greater protection in the exercise of free
speech than most of his colleagues.
B. Tenured or Untenured Status
Two companion cases define the limits of academic freedom for
untenured professors: Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth96
and Perry v. Sindermann.97 Decided on the same day, these cases
address (1) Roth's claim that the decision not to rehire him re-
sulted from his statements criticizing the university administra-
tion, and therefore violated his fourteenth amendment rights;98
and (2) Sindermann's claim that the college's failure to renew his
one-year contract was due to his public disagreements with the
Board of Regents, and violated both the first and fourteenth
amendments.9 Both claimants were untenured and employed by
state-owned institutions.
Both cases were five-to-three decisions. The Supreme Court
found that Roth was not entitled to a hearing nor did he have to
be advised of the reasons for Wisconsin State University's failure
to rehire him, since he was not deprived of "liberty" or "prop-
erty."100 The Court remanded Sindermann to the district court for
several determinations, including whether non-renewal was a repri-
sal for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.10
The question is whether these superficially inconsistent decisions
96. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
97. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
98. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566-69.
99. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 594-96.
100. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578-79 (noting that simply because a hearing was not required,
constitutionally the opportunity for a hearing regarding non-retention could be appropriate
in public colleges and universities).
101. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 603.
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can be reconciled. Sindermann had been employed as a professor
in the Texas junior college system from 1959-1969.102 Roth, on the
other hand, had served only one year at Wisconsin State Univer-
sity.1"3 This factual difference, while possibly significant in ob-
taining judicial sympathy for Sindermann, was not stressed in the
rationales of the two cases. Longevity alone cannot qualify one for
continuous future employment absent a contract provision to that
effect.10 4
The situation in Roth is more common than in Sindermann,
since probationary untenured faculty members are terminated
more readily. At that time, Wisconsin law left the decision whether
to rehire an untenured professor for the next academic year to the
unfettered discretion of university officials, and further provided
that the reason for non-retention need not be given. 0 5
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the untenured
Roth had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a
hearing on the university's decision not to rehire him. The Court
looked to the nature of Roth's interest in renewal of his employ-
ment, only to find that it was neither a "liberty" nor a "property"
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. 08 The Court
noted that the university had not imposed a stigma or other disa-
bility on him that limited his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities. 01 Thus, in the Court's view, the uni-
versity's refusal to rehire him was not so damaging to Roth's lib-
erty to teach as to require a hearing.
The Court also found that the University of Wisconsin did not
deprive Roth of a property interest, as "property" is understood
when applying the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that
"[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."' 1 8 The Court suggested the failure of
state colleges and universities to provide reasons for non-renewal
102. Id. at 594.
103. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566.
104. See generally Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975).
105. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567 (construing Wis. STAT. § 37.31(1) (1967)).
106. Id. at 578-79.
107. Id. at 573.
108. Id. at 577.
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and a hearing was not good institutional policy.1 9 However, it was
a bad policy that was nonetheless constitutional. The Court also
found Roth's freedom-of-speech issue meritless. The district court
had stayed proceedings on the allegations that non-renewal was
based on the exercise of first amendment rights. 10
The majority in Roth rejected the two main conclusions ex-
pressed in Justice Douglas' dissent: (1) that non-renewal is "a
blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively limits any
chance the teacher has of being rehired""' at least by the same
state system, and (2) that allegations of denial of free speech re-
quire the government to prove that the speech does not require
due process protection. 1 2 It also rejected Justice Marshall's dis-
senting opinion that the "liberty" and "property" criteria of the
fourteenth amendment were met in Roth because the employer
was the government." 3 Marshall opined that every citizen-appli-
cant for a government job is entitled to be hired unless the govern-
ment can establish some reason for its refusal to do so." 4 He would
have afforded the untenured Roth a constitutionally guaranteed
hearing and a statement of the reasons for non-retention for a sec-
ond year's employment. 1 5
In Sindermann, the employer explained his reason for not re-
newing the professor's contract in a press release. Sindermann was
allegedly let go for insubordination." 6 However, he received
neither an official statement of the reasons for his dismissal nor a
hearing upon non-renewal. Sindermann, who professed the belief
that the Texas two-year college system should become a four-year
system, contended that his advocacy of that view resulted in his
termination, in violation of first (free speech) and fourteenth (pro-
cedural due process) amendment rights."17
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Texas community college system. However, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to afford Sindermann the opportunity to prove
109. Id. at 578-79.
110. Id. at 574-75.
111. Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 584.
113. Id. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 588.
115. Id. at 590-91.
116. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 595 n.1. Specifically, Sindermann attended legislative com-
mittee meetings despite college officials' refusal to allow him to leave class for that purpose.
117. Id. at 595.
1991] 253
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
his claim of entitlement to continued employment.'
One explanation for the different treatment by the Supreme
Court of the two "untenured" professors, Roth and Sindermann, is
the latter's longevity in the same educational system together with
the possibility "that the college had a de facto tenure system."
119
In affording Sindermann the opportunity to prove tenure earned
under a de facto system, the Court appeared to express a different
judicial philosophy of academic freedom for educators than it had
expressed in Roth.
In Sindermann, the Court stated that the "lack of a contractual
or tenure 'right' to re-employment .. .is immaterial to his free
speech claim,"' 2 citing and reaffirming Shelton v. Tucker 12 1 and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.122 Later the same majority opinion
stated that "lack of formal contractual or tenure security . ..
though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly relevant to his
procedural due process claim. But it may not be entirely disposi-
tive.' 23 Without conceding that Sindermann could show a loss of
liberty or property, the Court found he was entitled to the oppor-
tunity to do so at a hearing. His claim was bolstered by job secur-
ity statements in the "Odessa Junior College Faculty Guide" and
in guidelines established by the Coordinating Board of the Texas
College and University System.12
4
A cynic might suggest that the different outcomes of Roth and
Sindermann resulted only from the professors' disparate lengths of
prior service rather than upon due process protections for tenured
faculty. Perhaps a fairer and more workable analysis is that de
facto tenure may have resulted from an "implied"1 21 agreement
even though the faculty handbook stated that "Odessa College has
no tenure system.' 12
In Cusumano v. Ratchford,127 two probationary professors ar-
118. Id. at 602-03.
119. Id. at 599-600.
120. Id. at 597-98.
121. 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960).
122. 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). Justice Douglas no doubt would have suggested the ad-
ditional precedential value of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), 354 U.S. at
234, protecting even the freedom of a guest lecturer.
123. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599.
124. Id. at 600.
125. Id. at 601-02.
126. Id. at 600.
127. 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974).
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gued that they obtained de facto tenure because the University of
Missouri gave slightly less notice than was required by the univer-
sity's written rules for non-renewal of probationary faculty.1 2s Nev-
ertheless, the court refused to find de facto tenure, concluding that
the facts simply did not support a constitutional or contractual
claim for continuous employment. 129 Cusumano, decided after
Roth and Sindermann, established that an educational system's
failure to adhere strictly to the letter of its tenure procedures does
not alone result in de facto tenure.
The absence of tenure is not always fatal in the advancement of
a constitutionally-based claim. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,30
Sweezy refused to answer some of the questions posed in the New
Hampshire state investigation designed to eliminate "subversive
persons" from government employment. Two of the questions he
refused to answer were: "What was the subject of your [guest] lec-
ture [at the University of New Hampshire]?," and "Did you advo-
cate Marxism at that time?"'' Neither the majority nor the con-
curring opinions found the lack of tenure determinative in purging
the contempt citation against the professor for his refusal to an-
swer certain questions he deemed "irrelevant or violative of free
speech guarantees.' 1 32
Untenured educators were also successful in advancing first
amendment rights in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of the State of New York13 3 and in Shelton v. Tucker. 34 Keyi-
shian, an untenured instructor of English at the University of Buf-
falo, refused to sign a state-mandated certificate that he was not a
"subversive" (communist), resulting in his dismissal. 35 The Court
vindicated Keyishian by finding the New York statute unconstitu-
tional. It rejected the premise "that public employment, including
academic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of
128. Id. at 986. Instructor Cusumano claimed that the notice he received of March 31,
1971, stating that 1971-72 would be his last academic year at the university was contrary to
his entitlement of notice of not less than one year. Associate Professor Harmon made a
claim similar to Cusumano's. Both believed they should have more than a full academic year
in which to seek new employment.
129. Id.
130. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
131. Id. at 243-44.
132. Id. at 258 (involving an elaborate legislative scheme to have the state attorney gen-
eral investigate with respect to subversive activities and to report back to the legislature).
133. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
134. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
135. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-92.
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constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govern-
ment action."' 6 Thus, the Court repudiated the state's stance that
people should work elsewhere if their beliefs do not accord with
the legislature's. In Shelton v. Tucker, 3 7 the Court declared un-
constitutional an Arkansas statute requiring every teacher in a
state-supported school or college to file annually a list of organiza-
tions to which he belonged or regularly contributed.'38 In Arkansas
all professors and other teachers were hired on a year-to-year ba-
sis.139 The first amendment protection was extended to teachers
who were untenured, thereby preventing governmental evaluations
of their beliefs based upon organizational associations. "'
The precedential value of Sweezy, Keyishian, and Shelton may
be affected by the political climate out of which they arose. During
the "McCarthy Era" the federal and state governments zealously
sought to identify and weed out persons with political beliefs left
of center. This era was characterized by legislative and administra-
tive hunts for "communists" in callous disregard for the civil liber-
ties of the prey. Through these court decisions the judiciary fur-
nished governmental reasonableness. The Court's guardianship of
first amendment rights 'for faculty, even for the untenured, was so-
cially valuable in that era. It also introduced the judicial concept of
academic freedom. If later administrations attempt to impose un-
reasonable burdens on intellectual expression or inquiry, both the
tenured and untenured have these three important Supreme Court
opinions for refuge against irrationality and bigotry.
Before leaving the tenure area, one tactical consideration should
be noted. A college or university. which does not permit a proba-
tionary faculty member to be considered for tenure is in a much
stronger position to defend against a claim of wrongful termina-
tion. First, property interests "are not created by the constitu-
tion,"'' and a tenure-denied stigma cannot attach to a professor
whose contract is simply not renewed. Second, considering the
multiple levels of tenure review utilizing on-campus administra-
tors, instructional faculty, and off-campus peer evaluators, the op-
portunity for allegations of a denial of due process is significant.
136. Id. at 605.
137. 364 U.S. at 479.
138. Id. at 480.
139. Id. at 485-90.
140. Id. at 482.
141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The only perceived institutional disadvantage of ending the em-
ployment relationship by permitting a term contract to expire (af-
ter giving proper notice) is that non-renewal is purely an adminis-
trative action. The college or university exercising institutional
autonomy in this way cannot later claim that teaching faculty
found that the candidate failed to meet the criteria for continuous
employment.
C. Public-Private Dichotomy
Colleges and universities are either state-owned or privately-
owned entities. This public-private dichotomy in post-secondary
education sometimes determines the extent of an individual pro-
fessor's academic freedom. The law affords greater protection for
public sector scholars than it does for their colleagues in private
enterprise.
To be relied upon successfully in matters before the courts, indi-
vidual academic freedom must be rooted in some related constitu-
tional or statutory provision, or in an express or implied employ-
ment contract right. Academic freedom has been tied to the first
amendment's rights of free speech and assembly and to the four-
teenth amendment's due process requirements.'42 These federal
constitutional protections would not generally be available to a
faculty member of a private college or university because the alle-
gations of institutional impropriety would not involve "state ac-
tion.' 143 However, certain statutory rights are available to private
sector faculty as well as to employees of government owned and
operated colleges and universities. Currently, the statutory rights
most frequently exercised by professors are those found in Title
VII prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, -or national origin. .
While teachers at private colleges cannot allege state action, it is
nonetheless unlikely that courts will tolerate these schools' com-
plete disregard for their faculty's constitutional rights. Justice
142. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-69
(1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,-354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957).
143. Bunton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
144. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); see also Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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Douglas noted the public-private dichotomy in Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,14 5 maintaining that "the First Amendment,
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects the individual against state action when it comes to...
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment."' 4 Although recog-
nizing that faculty working in private institutions have less govern-
ment-protected academic freedom, Justice Douglas did not endorse
differentiating on the basis of the public-private dichotomy.
Rather, he noted that, "[t]he same [impropriety of dismissal due to
philosophical, political, or ideological beliefs] may well be true of
private schools, if through the device of financing or other umbili-
cal cords they become instrumentalities of the State."'14 7
These umbilical cords, including federal funding, regulation, stu-
dent aid, and tax status considerations, may be relied upon suc-
cessfully in the future to extend protections of the first and four-
teenth amendments to faculty in the private sector. One
institution, Grove City College, refused to accept federal funds in
assertion of its purely private character. "8 If the autonomy of pri-
vate institutions to foster intellectual expressions and experimen-
tations is someday curtailed, the cases will involve not only the
federal nexus, but also the belief that society benefits from the un-
fettered inquiries and intellectual expression of scholars. Because
experimentation, research, and synthesis by professors is deemed
valuable to society, perhaps private institutions will use enough
self-restraint to avoid a "test case" to determine whether due pro-
cess, equal protection, and first amendment rights will be extended
to private sector faculty under a federal nexus theory.
Admittedly, no evidence exists to test the hypothesis that pri-
vate colleges and universities generally afford their faculties as
much academic freedom as do public educational institutions. In-
dividual reputations among peer schools and the competition to
hire the best scholars, should induce many private institutions to
allow their faculty a full share of academic freedom. In a case in-
volving a professor's claim of dismissal due to his participation in
on-campus political protests, Stanford University (a private
school) conceded the state action issue.-49 In voluntarily giving up
145. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
146. Id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
149. See Franklin v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 172 Cal. App. 3d 322, 328 n.3, 218 Cal.
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what was probably its best defense, Stanford demonstrated its high
regard for the promotion of academic freedom for faculty.
A private college or university's voluntary assurance of academic
freedom takes on additional importance considering the Burger
Court's narrow approach to "state action."' 150 The private univer-
sity professor with a first amendment-type claim seeking redress
for university infringements of academic freedom will probably
have to rely on the terms of his employment contract or applicable
state statutes. Logically, we should permit no less academic free-
dom for private university professors than for professors at state-
supported schools. However, the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment are designed to protect individuals from the state and
not from private infringements upon individual liberties. 15'
Some private institutions are owned by or are affiliated with va-
rious religious groups. The AAUP expressly recognizes the religious
nexus as a reason for some limitation on the exercise of academic
freedom. 52 The beliefs of a particular religion might well influence
curriculum structure and employment practices. The AAUP posi-
tion is not, of course, binding on the courts, and the employment
practices of all academic institutions must conform to Title VII
mandates against impermissible discrimination. 53
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
Institutional autonomy is the freedom of a college or university
from state control. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire," Justice Frank-
furter categorized the four areas in which a college or university
needs discretionary authority which, when wisely exercised, can
enhance its reputation and its effectiveness in educating students.
An academic institution needs "to determine for itself on academic
Rptr. 228, 230 n.3 (1985).
150. See Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Schubert, State Action
and the Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 323 (1970).
151. The Bill of Rights provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
of speech, U.S. CONsT. amend. I, while the fourteenth amendment extends this guarantee to
protect against state action as well. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Thus, only governmental ac-
tion, legislative, administrative or judicial, qualifies as "state action" when a litigant claims
academic freedom as an adjunct of free speech or some other constitutional safeguard. Ac-
tions of nongovernmental entities such as private colleges or universities, ordinarily do not
qualify as "state action."
152. Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; see, e.g., AAUP POLIcY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 84.
153. See supra notes 84-85, 91-93 and accompanying text.
154. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."'55 Interestingly, Jus-
tice Frankfurter described these determinations as an exercise of
"essential freedoms," rather than "academic freedoms. "15 6
Two decades later in Regents. of the University of California v.
Bakke,157 Justice Powell reiterated Frankfurter's four categories of
institutional decision making. The Court does appear to equate
"academic freedom" with "[t]he freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includ[ing] the selection of its
student body.' 58 In Widmar v. Vincent, 59 Justice Powell may
have suggested a fifth freedom, "the right of the University to
make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce re-
sources."' 60 Since availability of financial assets undoubtedly influ-
ences hiring practices, curriculum, pedagogy, and admissions poli-
cies, Justice Powell thoughtfully injected into the discussion the
reality that the range of managerial decisions for any one institu-
tion is dependent upon its resources. Surely he did not intend to
suggest a theoretically lesser degree of autonomy for the less afflu-
ent colleges and universities. In Widmar he was contemplating the
prospect that more student organizations might request use of the
university's space than the entity could financially
accommodate.' 6 '
The Widmar opinion recognizes that colleges and universities
have taken on a duty to provide educational opportunities not di-
rectly connected to coursework. The administrative difficulty of
determining which extracurricular activities will be favored with
the use of physical facilities and other support is discussed. The
Widmar Court held that the University of Missouri, a state univer-
sity, could not deny use of its facilities to an on-campus religious
student group when it made facilities generally available to other
registered student groups: "a state regulation of speech should be
content-neutral."'6 2 In terms of academic freedom, Widmar limits
the scope of institutional autonomy in selecting only certain extra-
155. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
156. Id.
157. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
158. Id. at 312-20.
159. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (challenging the University of Missouri's denial of use of its
facilities for extracurricular purposes by a student religious group).
160. Id. at 276.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 277.
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curricular activities when first amendment rights are involved.
A. The Princeton Grounds
State law may also place limitations on institutional autonomy
as was recently demonstrated in a New Jersey case, State v.
Schmid.163 Schmid, representing the U.S. Labor Party, went onto
Princeton University property to sell party literature. The solicita-
tion would have complied with the university's rules only if
Schmid was affiliated with that institution, had been invited by a
person affiliated with it, or obtained a Princeton-issued permit to
distribute the literature.6 4 Schmid met none of these criteria. The
written rules included no criteria for the issuance of a permit,1 65
and the university's policy was not to issue one unless the appli-
cant had an invitation. 6 6 Schmid was convicted of criminal tres-
pass and fined fifteen dollars plus court costs.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on the free speech guar-
antee of the New Jersey Constitution, exonerated Schmid of crimi-
nal liability. This state appellate court stated that the extent to
which indiscriminate political solicitation could be denied by the
private academic institution on open areas of the campus de-
pended upon (1) the nature of the "normal" use of the area; (2) the
extent of the invitation to the public to use the property; and (3)
the purpose of the expressive activity in relation to the private and
public use. 67 These are the factors that the New Jersey state
courts use in balancing college or university prerogatives against
the state constitutional guarantee of free expression. They appear
to strike a balance with institutional autonomy rather than institu-
tional academic freedom.
In Kahn v. Superior Court (Davies),6 8 the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth District of California declared that "the fostering of aca-
demic excellence finds support in the [state] constitutional right to
privacy.' 169 Davies was a visiting professor who, following rejection
of his candidacy to fill a chair in the history department at Stan-
163. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
164. 84 N.J. at 538-41, 423 A.2d at 616-18.
165. Id. at 567-68, 423 A.2d at 632.
166. Id. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618.
167. Id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
168. 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987).
169. Id. at 770, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
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ford University, sued one of the tenured history professors (Kahn)
who participated in official confidential discussions leading to his
rejection. 170 When Davies sought to depose Kahn, Kahn attempted
to avoid being deposed by asserting his rights to academic freedom
and privacy.17 While the court effectively briefed all of the federal
circuit court opinions then dealing with the conflict between aca-
demic freedom and disclosure of faculty votes and comments on
personnel matters, 2 it decided against compelling the deposition
based on the privacy assurances of article 1, section 1 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution.7
B. Freedom Beyond Autonomy?
The right and duty of a college or university to manage itself is
an underlying theme in the "academic freedom" case law. The
boards and the top administrative officials of public and private
institutions of higher learning are chosen to establish policy for
"their" entity. Courts normally defer to decisions of the boards
and employees who are authorized to govern and operate their des-
ignated institutions. Public colleges and universities are subject to
state legislative and administrative constraints in fiscal, personnel,
and property management matters. Even private schools are not
absolutely free of federal or state regulation. If they were, they
would be on equal footing with the federal government, that is,
completely autonomous.
Over the last few decades courts and legislatures have been
asked to influence managerial decisions and to provide remedies
for parties claiming injury as a result of certain managerial actions.
Examples of injuries not involving academia include injuries from
defective products, gerrymandering to dilute the voting influence
of minority groups, and corporate take-overs ousting existing man-
agement and affecting the value of stockholders' equity. The
quests for governmental paternalism to protect or to destroy the
status quo include the extension of Title VII coverage to colleges
and universities, even though the result is a lessening of academia's
170. Id. at 755-57, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 663-65.
171. Id. at 758-59, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
172. Id. at 759-63, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69.
173. Id. at 765, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 670. While Stanford was not a party to the defamation
business interference suit, the court in preventing Kahn's deposition relied upon the univer-
sity's need for confidentiality as to what goes on in the peer review process. Id. at 768, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 673.
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right to determine who will teach.174 While these institutions need
to be able to exercise freedom "on academic grounds,' ' 5 gender-
based or race-based discrimination in hiring or promotion cannot
be defended as promoting academic excellence. Rather, discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin suggests
that a college or university is not allocating its scarce resources in a
way that will procure for it the best faculty those resources can
attract. Only if an employer hires or promotes the lesser qualified
person out of fear of litigation will Title VII have an adverse im-
pact on its academic programs. When the decision is on academic
grounds, a Title VII violation will not occur.
Institutional autonomy for colleges and universities is justified
on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the
boards and top level management possess the expertise in adminis-
tering schools that a court could not be expected to acquire. When
academic administrations are situated to do their job well, they are
familiar with the factual peculiarities of the organization they
manage. Courts defer to the decisions of managers in academia
simply because the judiciary is not generally responsible for select-
ing the paths that will lead an educational institution to excel-
lence, mediocrity, or failure. As a practical matter, expending judi-
cial resources to improve the goals and operations of an
educational institution would be an unwise use of court time and
energy. If every discretionary decision in academia were subject to
judicial scrutiny, the courts would be swamped with cases filed by
dissatisfied faculty, students, and outsiders challenging administra-
tive decisions.
Institutional autonomy generally provides unfettered discretion
174. The extension was explained succinctly in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110
S. Ct. 577, 582-83 (1990).
When Title VII was enacted originally in 1964, it exempted an "educational institu-
tion with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with
the educational activities of such institution." § 702, 78 Stat. 255. Eight years later,
Congress eliminated that specific exemption by enacting § 3 of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103. This extension of Title VII was Congress'
considered response to the widespread and compelling problem of invidious discrimi-
nation in educational institutions. The House Report focused specifically on discrimi-
nation in higher education, including the lack of access for women and minorities to
higher ranking (i.e., tenured) academic positions .... Significantly, opponents of the
extension claimed that enforcement of Title VII would weaken institutions of higher
education by interfering with decisions to hire and promote faculty members.
Id.
175. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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in matters involving employment of faculty, curriculum, pedagogy,
and admission of students. Indeed, a search reveals no recent case
litigating the merits of a college or university decision in the cur-
ricular or pedagogical areas.176 The recent cases involving limita-
tions on autonomy concern who may attend and who may teach.
C. Who May Attend
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,'7 involves a
medical school admissions program which favored applicants be-
longing to disadvantaged minority groups. This preferential treat-
ment for the disadvantaged was challenged by a white male who
claimed that rejection of his application under the school's pro-
gram violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,178 and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While the
Justices who agreed on the outcome disagreed somewhat on the
rationale, the Court's decision is significant because it limits a uni-
versity's right to determine for itself who it may admit.179
A later case, Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,180
emphatically recognizes the general judicial deference to institu-
tional decisions. Ewing was admitted into a special six-year pro-
gram which, if successfully completed, would result in the award of
an undergraduate and a medical degree.181 Immediately upon com-
mencement of the program and continuously thereafter, Ewing ex-
176. Some older cases do involve curricular and pedagogical considerations and are at
least of historical significance in deciding academic freedom and institutional autonomy is-
sues that may arise in the future. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invali-
dating legislation in Hawaii regulating schools conducted in a foreign language, primarily
Japanese); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon law compel-
ling public school attendance for children between the ages of 8 and 16); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law forbidding instruction in any language other than
English until after the eighth grade); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (al-
lowing criminal conviction of college under Kentucky law for teaching blacks and whites
together despite charter provisions encouraging that practice); Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs., 43
U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844) (upholding college's charter right to exclude ecclesiastics, missiona-
ries, or ministers of any sect whatsoever from the premises). While these cases demonstrate
the age-old state questioning of specific acts of institutional autonomy, the rationales must
be considered in light of the expansion of first amendment law since 1952. In that year the
Court held that the first amendment, through the fourteenth, protects liberty against in-
fringement by the states. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952).
177. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1988).
179. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
180. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
181. Id. at 215.
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perienced pronounced academic difficulties. 182 In addition, he
failed the National Board of Medical Examiners ("NBME") test, a
prerequisite for undertaking the final two years of the program.
The University refused Ewing an opportunity to retake the quali-
fying test, although it had allowed other students over the years to
retake the NBME. 83 Ewing sought a court order allowing him a
second chance at the NBME. He alleged that he had a property
interest in the program and that the school's decision to dismiss
him was arbitrary and capricious and violated his substantive due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment.""'
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens pointed out
that the federal courts are inappropriate forums "to evaluate the
substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made
daily by faculty members of public educational institutions. '185
Such decisions, he maintained, cannot be adapted to the proce-
dural tools of judicial or administrative decision making because
the decisions require an expert evaluation of cumulative informa-
tion. 86 While Justice Stevens opined that an institutional decision
giving Ewing a second chance at the test might have prevented
protracted litigation, he and the other Justices had no difficulty in
finding that institutional autonomy existed and was properly, if
unwisely, exercised. Justice Powell, agreeing "fully with the Court's
emphasis on the respect and deference that courts should accord
academic decisions,' 8 7 would have expanded the rationale to deny
(rather than "assume") that Ewing's interest in the program raised
any issue of substantive due process.188
Admissions practices are not, however, completely beyond the
control of government. In Runyon v. McCrary"9 the Court held
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act proscribed discrimination against
blacks in admission even by a nonsectarian, private, commercially
operated school. 90
182. Id. at 217 n.4.
183. Id. at 216.
184. Id. at 217.
185. Id. at 226.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
190. Id. at 175.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
D. Who May Teach
Institutional autonomy allows post-secondary educational enti-
ties to hire, retain, promote, or dismiss whomever they please, sub-
ject to constitutional, statutory and contractual rights. Title VII is
currently a high profile statute superimposed on the institution-
professor contract,19 1 although it is not the only important federal
statute prohibiting discrimination against members of minorities.
Under Title VII, unlawful employment practices involve institu-
tional acts and practices with respect to compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. 192
Even Title VII tenure-denial cases reinforce the courts general
reluctance to interfere with institutional decisions. In Lieberman v.
Gant,193 the Second Circuit deferred to the University of Connecti-
cut's "rigorous standards"'" 4 for tenure. It recognized that a
teacher's demonstration of qualifications for continuation as an un-
tenured faculty member did not alone show that the applicant had
met the university's criteria for virtually life-time employment:
"Title VII does not require that the candidate whom a court con-
siders most qualified for a particular position be awarded that po-
sition. . .. .."' The court viewed the purposes of the tenure pro-
cess as two-fold: (1) to leave vacancies for more qualified prospects
and (2) to permit a university's quest for excellence rather than for
mediocrity. 9 6
Decisions as to who should be hired into tenure-track positions,
like the granting of tenure itself, are ill-suited for federal court su-
pervision. 97 It must be remembered, however, that the anti-in-
terventionist position of the courts is limited by the mandates of
191. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
193. 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
194. Id. at 64.
195. Id. at 67.
196. Id. at 70.
197. See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (a Title VII
sex-discrimination claimant asking the court to examine the university's recruitment, com-
pensation, promotion and termination practices); see also Huang v. College of Holy Cross,
436 F. Supp 639, 653 (D. Mass. 1977); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp.
1328, 1353-54 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Cussler v. University of Maryland, 430 F. Supp. 602, 605-06
(D. Md. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D. Vt. 1976); Labat v.
Board of Higher Educ., 401. F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.198 Thus, tension
will remain between judicial non-intervention into college and uni-
versity affairs and the legislatively mandated court duty to provide
redress for impermissibly discriminatory employment practices
throughout academia. 9" While institutional autonomy does not
permit discrimination on racist or sexist grounds, "the law does
not require . . . that employment be rational, wise, or well-
considered. °0
Title VII and academic freedom for individuals have a common
feature. They are counter-majoritarian provisions, the former
designed to remove race and gender as a barrier to career advance-
ment, and the latter to protect academics whose ideas offend those
who have the influence to thwart career advancement. Title VII is
a burden on institutional autonomy only if one accepts the as-
sumption that academic employers find race-based and sex-based
discrimination more important than hiring, retaining, or promoting
the best qualified person their budgets can afford.
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom for any person in any particular endeavor requires re-
straint by other entities, whether natural, judicial or governmental.
Freedom of speech is the first amendment right to say whatever
one wants to say, short of defamation or speech conduct that
would qualify as incitement to overthrow the government or that
would endanger public safety. The free speech guarantee serves as
the basis of the concept of academic freedom.
Academic freedom has been judicially created and partially de-
fined in resolving legal controversies in which one or both of the
parties was a scholar or a post-secondary educational institution.
State constitutions are also applicable in determining the contours
of academic freedom. A party seeking the protection of a constitu-
tional right hopes to triumph using a choice of weapons. If courts
afford academic freedom protection, statutory rights and common
law rights (including contractual rights) will be subordinated.
Academic freedom as a legal concept was "born" out of the loy-
alty investigations of the 1950s. These investigations targeted aca-
198. See supra note 174.
199. See, e.g., PoweU v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (2d Cir. 1978).
200. Id. at 1156-57.
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demics who were suspected of harboring communist political be-
liefs. The investigatory harassment was directed at scholars rather
than at the colleges or universities where they taught or lectured.
Sweezy and other cases not only protected scholars against unrea-
sonable inquiries into their political beliefs, but also acknowledged
the important contributions that educational institutions can make
in the formation of public policy.
Colleges and universities are traditional and convenient places
for the scholarly advancement of new ideas. Faculty, especially
those in the social sciences, are well qualified to inquire into and
speculate about social problems, and to stimulate others to reflect
upon them. The values of society tend to reprioritize over the
years, with the result that dissent in one era may become the gen-
erally accepted view in another. This phenomenon justifies the Su-
preme Court's admonition that scholarly activity should be gener-
ally unfettered.
Given the appropriateness of academic freedom for faculty, the
question becomes whether the courts should extend the same pro-
tection to colleges and universities, the institutional camp sites for
scholarship and research. There appears to be no reason for doing
so except to the extent that these institutions need enough auton-
omy to ensure the independence and fearlessness of their faculty.
In University of Pennsylvania v.,EEOC,201 the Supreme Court
refused to accept academic freedom as a justification for the uni-
versity's claim of confidentiality for peer review information sought
by the EEOC. The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the
state constitution was of greater weight than a private university's
interest in deciding who could enter its campus. 202 Proprietary in-
terests were also subordinated to free speech by the Supreme
Court in Widmar v. Vincent, 03 holding that a university must ob-
serve the content-neutral feature of governmental regulation af-
fecting the exercise of free speech.
In no case has a college or university successfully relied upon
academic freedom to justify its actions absent simultaneous protec-
tion for scholarly activity. Although refusing to extend the concept
of academic freedom to policies and practices of colleges and uni-
201. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
202. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
203. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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versities, the courts nevertheless do defer to manyof the decisions
that these institutions make. Generally, colleges and universities
are free to determine, on academic grounds, who teaches, what is
taught, how it is taught, and who may join the student body. It
would seem that the courts' deference to decisions in these impor-
tant areas recognizes institutional autonomy, but not necessarily
academic freedom.
Institutional autonomy fosters healthy competition among post-
secondary educational institutions. Courts, although a vital seg-
ment of the system of checks and balances, are a part of the gov-
ernment, as they act as guardians of civil liberties. Frequent intru-
sions by the courts into the decision-making processes of colleges
and universities would be unwarranted. As noted in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing, °4 judges are not equipped to
make academic decisions because such decisions require an expert
evaluation of cumulative information. Institutional autonomy per-
mits each college or university to excel, muddle through, or fail on
its own, placing unfettered managerial responsibility in the
institution.
Institutional autonomy is a workable theory, Colleges and uni-
versities are free to govern themselves within the limits of the law.
For example, these institutions are generally free to determine per-
sonnel matters, curriculums, pedagogues, and the composition of
their respective student bodies. Supreme Court deference to these
institutional determinations was recently reaffirmed in Ewing. °0
Since the doctrine of institutional autonomy is not derived from
the Constitution, however, the policies and practices of colleges
and universities cannot conflict with statutes or terms of an em-
ployment contract. Thus, contractual, constitutional, and statutory
rights must be honored by public and private institutions.
Institutional autonomy regarding enrollment is also limited by
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection provision. In Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke, 0 6 the Supreme
Court re-evaluated the university's admission program, finding
that the terms of the program were constitutionally inappropriate,
although designed to pursue the commendable institutional goal of
204. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
205. Id.
206. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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diversity among the student members. In Runyon v. McCrary,"'
the Court held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act proscribed discrimi-
nation against blacks even by a nonsectarian, private, commer-
cially-,operated school.
If no legal limitation existed with regard to institutional auton-
omy, colleges and universities would be as powerful as the federal
government. In striking an appropriate balance between govern-
mental intrusions into the operations of colleges and universities,
adoption of institutional autonomy is a practical doctrine. "Institu-
tional academic freedom," on the other hand, is an unworkable,
unwise, and unsuccessful concept in establishing the limits of a col-
lege or university's autonomy.
It appears that academic freedom belongs solely to members of
the faculty. Such a restrictive use of such freedom will in no way
detract from institutional autonomy. Rather, acknowledgment of
the restriction will encourage better legal analyses when colleges
and universities consider claiming rights against faculty, or against
outsiders who, for example, seek admission to the student body or
to use the institution's facilities.
To speak of academic freedom for scholars may give the appear-
ance of sentimentality or subjectivity. Even Justice Frankfurter's
analysis of the need for unfettered scholarship 208 might sound
pompous to someone who is unfamiliar with the operations and
contributions of colleges and universities or who takes liberty for
granted. Given the inevitable changes in societal values, the com-
mon body of knowledge developed by scholars should be available
for analyzing current societal problems and for suggesting appro-
priate reforms. Sweezy and its progeny serve to guarantee aca-
demic freedom for faculty.
A review of constitutional case law demonstrates that the con-
cept of academic freedom is designed to protect individual schol-
ars, even against the institutions where they serve. For clarity and
ease of analysis, it appears from the same review that institutional
rights against intrusions by government should be analyzed and
determined under the doctrine of institutional autonomy. Colleges
and universities can claim governmental protection when they act
to shield individual scholars from political influences. These insti-
tutions can perform this necessary function derivatively through
207. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
208. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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academic freedom for faculty or through their own rights under
institutional autonomy.

